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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most hotly litigated issues in copyright law are
those related to ownership. When a lone author, artist, composer, or
programmer, with his or her own funds, creates a work, the issue of
initial ownership is an easy one. The creator is the statutory "author,"
and its creator owns the work. However, when more than one person
or entity is involved in the creative process, the ownership issues
become a bit murky, due to uncertainty with regard to interpretation of
the relevant statutes in the Copyright Act of 1976.2 The litigated
ownership issue of the 1980s was "works made for hire."3 After an
intercircuit split in which four different standards were being applied
by the appellate courts,4 in 1989, in Community for Creative Non-
2 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear, Hope and Longingfor the Future ofAuthorship
and a Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes ofIntellectual Property, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1171-72 (2003) (explaining that the concept of authorship may be
too narrow).
3 The "works made for hire" doctrine dealt with the questions of who owns
copyrights in a work that is created by an independent commissioned contractor, and,
for purposes of the statute, what is an "employee."
4 These standards were: the right to supervise and control standard (Peregrine v.
Lauren, 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985)); the actual supervision and control
standard (Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984)); the Restatement of
Agency § 220 standard (Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults, Inc. v.
Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988);
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Violence v. James Earl Reid, the United States Supreme Court finally
resolved the issue, applying the Fifth and D.C Circuits' "Restatement
of Agency § 220" standard.6 As a result of the Reid case, many parties
who thought that they were the "authors" and owners of works were
left without any copyright interests whatsoever.
In order to attempt to have an authorship interest in the work,
parties with undefined or questionable rights to the works have
brought actions under the "joint works" doctrine. Consequently, the
new "hot" ownership issue in copyright law is "what is a joint work?"
Courts and commentators are presently in disagreement over the
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (C.C.N.V.), 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.
1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)); and the formal salaried employee standard
(Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989)). The formal salaried
employee standard followed by the Ninth Circuit was the standard advocated by the
Copyright Office in the Supreme Court litigation.
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
6 For a discussion of the "works made for hire" doctrine and its shortcomings, see
generally, Michael B. Landau, Works Made for Hire after Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. James Earl Reid: The Need for Statutory Reform and the
Importance of Contract, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107 (1990).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of a
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights:
(1) To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords
(2) To prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work
(3) To distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending
(4) In the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly
(5) In the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly
(6) In the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.).
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requirements for joint authorship. The recent trend among the courts,
first articulated by the Second Circuit in Childress v. Taylor,' is to
apply a two-prong test for determining whether a work is a "joint
work": (1) each of the contributions of the respective collaborators
must be independently copyrightable, and (2) there must be intent, at
the time of creation, that the parties be joint authors.
Both prongs of the standard are at odds with the express
language of the statute and the legislative intent of the Unites States
Congress. As a result, numerous co-authors are being denied the
benefits of their labors or creations by judges who have misconstrued
the "joint works" doctrine. In addition, there is more uncertainty
regarding the status of collaborative works than ever before, because
of the undue emphasis and reliance by the courts on prong two, the
"intent" prong. If the court stops the analysis at a determination of
lack of intent and does not deal with the contributions of the
collaborators, the rights of both parties are unclear, and the possibility
that neither party may employ the entire work lurks as a distinct
possibility. 9 In addition, the fact that different courts have different
interpretations will lead to forum shopping and uncertainty. The "joint
works" doctrine must be clarified and uniformly applied in all
jurisdictions.
II. JOINT WORKS CASES PRIOR TO THE 1976 ACT
The law of joint authorship, prior to the enactment of the 1976
Act, was derived from common law principles. The doctrine was
primarily formulated by the federal courts in New York, with Judge
Learned Hand being largely responsible. The first major "joint
8 945 F.2d 500, 504-06 (2d Cir. 1991).
9 See Benjamin E. Jaffe, Rebutting the Equality Principle: Adapting the Co-Tenancy
Law Model to Enhance the Remedies Available to Joint Copyright Owners, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1550-52 (2011) (arguing that a real property co-tenancy
model of ownership of joint works would eliminate the limited remedies provided by
the accounting remedy's "on-off switch" by placing too much weight on the
determination of joint authorship and equal co-ownership instead of recognizing the
inevitable unequal contributions to a work).
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authorship" case was Maurel v. Smith,10 a case before the Southern
District of New York in 1915. In Maurel, the plaintiff wrote the story
for a comic opera and made an agreement with the defendant to write
the libretto. The plaintiff contended that the parties agreed to be joint
authors. The defendant, without plaintiffs knowledge or consent,
finished the libretto and contracted with another party to publish and
copyright the entire opera.
Judge Learned Hand held that the parties had, indeed, agreed to
be joint authors. Because there was a dearth of United States law on
the subject, Judge Hand relied upon English law to reach his decision.
Judge Hand cited Levy v. Rutley1 2 for the proposition that joint
authorship exists when parties contribute labor to work under a
common and preconcerted design. 13 Judge Hand found such "joint
labor" and common design in the facts of the case. 14 The plot and
libretto met the criteria.
Later, in Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 16 the doctrine was further developed. In Marks, the plaintiff was
a lyricist and sold words to a music publisher.17  The publisher,
without plaintiffs knowledge or consent, hired a composer to write
accompanying music." The combination of words and music was
then copyrighted as a single song. 19 Judge Hand, this time sitting on
the Second Circuit, found the combination of words and music to be a
10 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
11 Id. at 197-98.
12 L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871).
13 See Maurel, 220 F. at 199-200.
14 id.
15 See id.
16 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
17 Id. at 266.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 266-67.
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"joint work."20 He stated that it was not relevant to the determination
that the words and the music were not written at the same time or that
the two "authors" did not work together, if the authors meant for their
respective works to combined in a single finished product. 2 1 Because
the lyricist gave the words to the publisher with the intent that they be
put to music, it was held that, from the start, each contributor intended
the work to be performed as a whole.22 Under Marks, therefore, it was
not necessary for the authors of a "joint work" to have worked together
or even, for that matter, to have been acquainted with each other for
the work to legally be classified as a "joint work."23
The doctrine was broadened in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co. ("Shapiro I"),24 yet another decision to which
Judge Hand contributed. In Shapiro I, commonly called the
"Melancholy Baby Case," a composer named Ernie Burnett wrote the
music and his wife wrote the lyrics to a song they called
"Melancholy."25 The song was sold to a publisher.26 The publisher
was unhappy with the lyrics and, with the consent of the composer,
Burnett, hired a lyricist named Norton to create new lyrics to go along
with Burnett's melody.27 The new version of the song, consisting of
Norton's lyrics and Burnett's music, was retitled "Melancholy Baby"
and became wildly famous.28 Later, when a copyright dispute arose
over ownership of the copyrights in the new song, the Second Circuit
held that Burnett and Norton were the joint owners of the song.29
2 01 Id. at 267.
21 id.
22 Marks, 140 F.2d at 267.
23 See id.
24 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
2 5 Id. at 407.
2 6 Id. at 408.
2 7 d.
2 81 Id. at 407-08.
2 9 Id. at 410.
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Burnett's wife did not have an ownership interest based upon her first
version of the lyrics.30
In some ways, the case is similar to Marks. Under Second
Circuit law at the time, all that was necessary for the work to be
considered a "joint work" was that each author have knowledge that
his or her work would be used in combination with another's as part of
a larger unitary whole. The Shapiro I case expands Marks, in that it
holds:
[I]f author A intended from the beginning to work with
author B, but later author C's work is substituted for
that of author B's work, then A and C will be
considered joint authors of the work that they created.
It was not necessary that A and C originally
collaborated because A had the intent to put his music
with someone's lyrics, and C wrote his lyrics intending
to combine it with A's music. It does not matter that A
originally wanted to combine his music with B's lyrics,
since he still wanted to create a unitary work. A,
therefore, had the necessary intent for a preconcerted,
common design. A was in collaboration with C, not
because he consented to the addition of C's lyrics, but
because he had the prior intent to combine his work
with that of another.31
The doctrine was again further liberalized in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. ("Shapiro II"),32 commonly known as the
"12th Street Rag" case - a completely different case involving the
same parties. In Shapiro II, a composer wrote piano music, with no
- - 33intention whatsoever of having it joined with lyrics. The piece, as
30 See Shapiro I, 161 F.2d at 410.
31 Scott C. Brophy, Joint Authorship Under the Copyright Law, 16 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 451, 457 (1994) (hereinafter "Brophy").
32 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955).
33 Id. at 570.
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34
written, was intended for solo piano. As was common, the composer
assigned his copyrights to his publisher.35 The publisher, against the
composer's wishes, hired a lyricist to write words to go along with the
melody.36 The Second Circuit held that this, too, was a "joint work."37
The Shapiro H decision stretched the "joint works" doctrine as
far as it could go. A combined work could be considered to be a "joint
work" even if one of the creators of a component part did not have any
intent to merge his or her part into a larger unitary whole. In addition,
it allowed the assignee of the composition to have the necessary intent,
as opposed to the author himself or herself. Shapiro II, in essence,
eliminated any requirement of collaboration on the part of the parties
involved.
Following Shapiro II, another music case arose in the Southern
District of New York. In Picture Music Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,38 an
employee for Walt Disney Productions wrote the words and music to a
song that was to be used in the Disney cartoon, The Three Little Pigs.39
After hearing the song, two writers working for the publishing
company, Irving Berlin, Inc., made some changes to the song to make
it more fitting for sale as a "popular song."4 0 Disney subsequently
assigned the rights to the song to the Berlin Company.41 During the
last year of the first term of copyright, when it was time to file for
renewal, the assignee of one of the writers at Berlin who had modified
the song claimed a "joint authorship" interest. 42
34 id.
35 See id.
36 id.
3 7 Id. at 570-71.
38 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
3 9 Id. at 642.
40 Id.
4 1 Id. at 643.
42 id.
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The court criticized the "12th Street Rag" case's elimination of
the collaboration requirement but avoided trying to get around
precedent by simply claiming that, under the facts of the case, a
holding of "joint authorship" was not warranted because the writers at
Berlin had not made a substantial enough contribution to the song to
be given an authorship interest. 43  The court in Picture Music,
therefore, despite criticism of Shapiro II, might have been compelled
to apply it, had there been a substantial contribution to the song by a
party other than the original author.44 It is interesting to note that the
concept of "substantial contribution" was also the center of another
music case involving the Bourne publishing company in the 1990s,
Woods v. Bourne, Inc.45 In that case, involving the termination rights
exception under section 304(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, the court
held that the additions of harmony and accompaniment to the "lead
sheet" (lyrics and melody) of a song were not "sufficiently original" to
qualify for separate copyright protection as a "derivative work."46
III. JOINT WORKS UNDER THE 1976 ACT
A. Section 101 and the Legislative History
The 1976 Copyright Act, which took effect on January 1, 1978,
was a huge reworking of many principles of copyright law.47
4 See id. at 647.
See generally Shapiro II, 221 F.2d at 570.
4 See Woods v. Bourne, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd in relevant
part, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
4 6 Id. at 122-23.
4 See generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (summarizing changes made in the 1976 Copyright
Act, Litman calls the act comprehensive and starkly different from its 1909
predecessor and the result of more than 10 years of legislative history; further
positing judicial interpretation of language contained within the act may lack
historical context because new legal regimes in employment law were created during
the bill's journey through Congress into law).
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Judicially created doctrines such as "fair use" and "joint works" were
codified in the new Act. The statutory definition of "joint work" is
contained in section 101: 4 8
A "joint work" is a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.49
The statute is relatively unambiguous. The only requirement,
according to the express language, is that the collaborators manifest an
intent to merge the work. According to the legislative history, the
requisite intent will be found "if the authors collaborated with each
other, or if each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the
knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the
contributions of other authors as 'inseparable or interdependent parts
of a unitary whole."' 5 0 In order for the work to be classified as a "joint
work," the desire to make the contributions part of a single end
" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
4 Id.; Childress, 945 F.2d at 505 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 120 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736) ("Parts of a unitary whole are
'inseparable' when they have little or no independent meaning standing alone. That
would often be true of a work of written text, such as the play that is the subject of
the pending litigation. By contrast, parts of a unitary whole are 'interdependent'
when they have some meaning standing alone but achieve their primary significance
because of their combined effect, as in the case of words and music of a song.
Indeed, a novel and a song are among the examples offered by the legislative
committee reports of the 1976 Copyright Act to illustrate the difference between
'inseparable' and 'interdependent' parts.").
50 See Stacy L. Jarret, Joint Ownership of Computer Software Copyright: A Solution
to the Work for Hire Dilemma, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1269 (1989) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 1476, at 120) (hereinafter "Jarret"); see also Nancy Perkins Spyke, The
Joint Work Dilemma: The Separately Copyrightable Contribution and Co-
Ownership Principles, 40 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 463, 466-67 (1993)
(hereinafter "Spyke"); see generally Shari Eileen Fine, The Fate ofJoint Authorship
After Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 9 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
151 (1990).
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product must be evidenced at the time of creation.5 As commentators
have noted, "the legislature considered a joint work to exist where
each party has the intention, at the time the writing is done, that his or
her part be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit."52
Furthermore, the legislative history behind the Copyright Act
makes it clear that Congress intended to reject the "12th Street Rag"
doctrine. Where there is a significant temporal difference between the
creation of the different parts of a work and no intention to combine
these parts into a final "unitary whole," the work will probably not be
considered to be a joint work. For example, according to the House
Report: "[A]lthough a novelist, playwright, or songwriter may write a
work with the hope or expectation that it will be used in a motion
picture, this is clearly a case of separate or independent authorship
rather than one where the basic intention was behind the writing of the
work for motion picture use."53
In addition, the Register of Copyrights' 1961 Report-when
Congress was already in the process of beginning to revise the Act-
stated that the copyright register would not go as far as the "12th Street
Rag" decision, but would follow the rules as developed in the previous
case law.54 Thus, it is clear that the case law, as established by Judge
Hand in the Second Circuit, with the exception of the later "12th Street
Rag" case, has been codified by the 1976 Copyright Act. It should
also be noted that the statute does not say anything regarding the
amount of work contributed by each author. Therefore, there is no
requirement that each author contribute the same amount of work to
the end product. The traditional view is that each respective
1 See Jarret, supra note 50 at 1269-70.
52 See William J. Dockery, The Importance of a Written Agreement When
Collaborators Created a Copyrighted Work in the Performing Arts, 28 ENT. &
SPORTS L. 8, 9 (2010-2011) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 120 ; S. REP. No. 473, at
103 (1976)).
53 H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 120.
54 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 90 (Comm. Print. 1961).
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contribution be at least something more than a de minimis
contribution.
A determination that the work is a "joint work" means that the
56
authors are tenants-in-common. Each party may exploit the work as
he or she desires, subject to a duty to account to the other joint
author(s). 7 An exception is that a joint author may not assign the
work or grant an exclusive license to the work without permission of
the other authors.5 8 In addition, each party, as a matter of law, will
own a pro rata share of the final work.59 On the other hand, if the
work is determined not to be a joint work, then a court should decide
the respective rights of the parties-something that has been avoided
in many of the recent cases.
B. Disagreement Among the Commentators
The primary reference books on Copyright, authored
respectively by Paul Goldstein, William Patry,61  and David
Spyke, supra note 50, at 466 (citing Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Comm'ns Serv.,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570, 575 (W.O. Mo. 1991)); see Greene v. Ablon, slip op., 2012
WL 4104792 at *11 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2012) (Even the parsimonious allegation of
a fifteen page book contribution was "well above the 'more than a word or a line'
guideline for determining whether a contribution is de minimis."). This is also the
position taken by Professor Nimmer in his treatise. See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6-07 (2012); but see 1 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE § 4.2.1.2, at 379 (1989)
(Goldstein takes a different view, that of independent copyrightability). The
competing reference works are discussed infra Section 3(B).
56 See C.C.A.V., 846 F.2d at 1498 ("Joint authors co-owning copyright in a work 'are
deemed to be tenants in common,' with 'each having an independent right to use or
license the copyright, subject only to a duty to account to the other co-owner for any
profits earned thereby."').
See Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984).
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN].
61 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT (2012).
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Nimmer,62  take different approaches to the "independently
copyrightable" requirement. Professor Goldstein states that "a
collaborative contribution will not produce a joint work, and a
contributor will not obtain a co-authorship interest, unless the
contribution represents original expression that could stand on its own
as the subject matter of copyright." 63 According to Goldstein, the use
of the word "author" in section 10164 and 302(b) 65 "implies that the
contributor of each must be a copyrightable 'work of authorship'
within the terms of section 102(a)." 66 Goldstein justifies this position
62 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (2012)
[hereinafter Nimmer].
63 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 60, § 4.2.1.2, at 4:16. But see H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 120
("[A] work is 'joint' if the authors collaborated with each other, or if each of the
authors prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it
would be merged with the contributions of other authors as 'inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole"').
64 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
65 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2012).
66 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 60, § 4.2.1.2, at 4:17. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)
("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression .... "); Mary LaFrance,
Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of
Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 197 (2001) ("[U]nder the Goldstein test, a person
can be a joint author only if he or she contributed at least some element of
copyrightable creative expression to the putative joint work. In other words, a
collaborator who contributes only ideas or facts cannot use another collaborator's
particularized expression of that material to provide the 'work of authorship'
necessary to bestow authorship status."); see also Jaffe, supra note 9, at 1561 n.82
(citing Goldstein, supra note 60, § 4.2.1.2 ) ( "While the courts following the
Goldstein view require a claimant seeking joint authorship to show that each putative
co-author made an independently copyrightable contribution to the work, there is no
requirement that the claimant show these independently copyrightable contributions
were equal." Thus, "the problem with the current accounting remedy exists
regardless of which school the courts adopt because joint authors inevitably make
unequal contributions, whether or not they are separately copyrightable."); see
generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (providing that copyright does not attach to
facts, ideas, systems, and methods).
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by arguing that any material that does not meet "the Copyright Act's
copyrightability standard falls within the public domain, which any
author is entitled to use without having to share proceeds from the
work's exploitation." 67 Therefore, under the Goldstein standard, an
author who contributes the idea for a work cannot be a joint author
because ideas are not copyrightable.68 William Patry also expounds
the "independent copyrightability" standard in his book:6 9
In order to be a "joint" author, one must be an "author."
To be an author, one must independently create and
contribute at least some minimal amount of expression.
The requirement that each joint author contribute
expression has important policy and constitutional
implications. From a policy perspective, the
requirement ensures that the scope of the joint
authorship doctrine is not expanded to include editors,
research assistants, actors in plays, and movie
consultants. Instead, reward for such contribution is
left to contract.70
In contrast, Professor Nimmer takes the view that each author
need not make a copyrightable contribution.7 1 Nimmer points out that
neither the Copyright Act of 1976 nor legislative history of the Act
provides support for the proposition that an author must make a
67 Norbert F. Kugele, How Much Does It Take?: Copyrightability as a Minimum
Standardfor Determining Joint Authorship, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 809, 820 (1991)
(citing GOLDSTEIN, supra note 60, § 4.2.1.2, at 4:17) [hereinafter Kugele]; see also
Brophy, supra note 31, at 465.
68 For several cases supporting Goldstein's view, see Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202
F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussed infra), Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916
F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990); S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th
Cir. 1989).
69 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5-14 (2012).
70 Id.
71 Nimmer, supra note 62 § 6.02
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'72
copyrightable contribution. He points to the definition of "joint
work" in section 101 of the 1976 Act, which contains no separate
requirement that each putative collaborator contribute something that
can stand alone as being independently copyrightable. 73 "Congress
made 'intention' the touchstone of joint authorship status while saying
nothing of a copyrightable contribution requirement.",7
Nimmer does, however, have a standard for each collaborator.
Each author's contribution must merely be more than de minimis.
"More than de minimis" means more than a few simple words or
phrases.76  According to Nimmer, contributing ideas, which in
themselves may not be independently copyrightable, may make one a
"joint author" if the party contributing the idea had the proper intent to
collaborate the intent to merge the contribution into a part of a unitary
whole. Therefore, if one author suggests plot ideas and the other
author creates the written story, the parties are joint authors.'78  The
contribution must be one that is creative; a party who contributes
financing so that the project may get under way is not a "joint
author.",79
72 id.
73 id.
See Brophy, supra note 31, at 464.
See NIMMER, supra note 62, § 6.07; see also Kugele, supra note 67, at 824-25;
Brophy, supra note 31, at 464-66; Russ Versteeg, Defining "Author"for Purposes
of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1333-34 (1996).
76 See id.
See NIMMER, supra note 62, § 6.07.
See Brophy, supra note 31, at 464-65 (citing NIMMER, supra note 62, § 6.07).
79 Id. See Jaffe, supra note 9, at 1558-60 (citing NIMMER, supra note 62 at § 6.07)
(noting that the prevailing equality standard of co-authorship is "especially
troublesome in these situations because in cases where parties have not contracted
their rights, it allows a co-author to obtain a fifty percent interest in the work even
though his actual contribution may have been negligible," which then "increases the
disparity between an author's contribution and his economic rewards .... ").
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IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES UNDER THE 1976 ACT
The courts are in disagreement over construing the statute. The
majority of courts agree with the standards set forth in Childress v.
Taylor,80 that (1) each party's contribution must be independently
copyrightable and (2) the parties must have had the intent to be joint
owners at the time that the work was created.81 The Childress case
and cases that follow are fact intensive, and are discussed in this
section.
A. Childress v. Taylor
In Childress, Clarice Taylor, an actress, developed a character
based upon the comedienne Jackie "Moms" Mabley for an off-
Broadway performance about the Apollo Theatre in Harlem. 82 In
order to prepare for her role, Taylor conducted extensive historic
research about Mabley, including "interviewing her friends and family,
collecting her jokes, and reviewing library resources." 83
The court in Childress explained the additional facts of the case
as follows:
In 1985, Taylor contacted the plaintiff,
playwright Alice Childress about writing a play based
on "Moms" Mabley. Childress had written many plays,
for one of which she won an "Obie" award. Taylor had
known Childress since the 1940s when they were both
associated with the American Negro Theatre in Harlem
and had previously acted in a number of Childress's
plays.
When Taylor first mentioned the "Moms"
Mabley project to Childress in 1985, Childress stated
so 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
81 See id.
82 Id. at 502.
83 id.
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she was not interested in writing the script because she
was too occupied with other works. However, when
Taylor approached Childress again in 1986, Childress
agreed, though she was reluctant due to the time
constraints involved. Taylor had interested the Green
Plays Theatre in producing the as yet unwritten play,
but the theatre had only one slot left on its summer
1986 schedule, and in order to use that slot, the play
had to be written in six weeks.
Taylor turned over all of her research material to
Childress, and later did further research at Childress's
request. It is undisputed that Childress wrote the play,
entitled "Moms: A Praise Play for a Black
Comedienne." However, Taylor, in addition to
providing the research material, which according to her
involved a process of sifting through facts and selecting
pivotal and key elements to include in a play on
"Moms" Mabley's life, also discussed with Childress
the inclusion of certain general scenes and characters in
the play. Additionally, Childress and Taylor spoke on a
regular basis about the progress of the play.
Taylor identifle[d] the following as her major
contributions to the play: (1) she learned through
interviews that "Moms" Mabley called all of her piano
players "Luther," so Taylor suggested that the play
include such a character; (2) Taylor and Childress
together interviewed Carey Jordan, "Moms" Mabley's
housekeeper, and upon leaving the interview they came
to the conclusion that she would be a good character for
the play, but Taylor could not recall whether she or
Childress suggested it; (3) Taylor informed Childress
that "Moms" Mabley made a weekly trip to Harlem to
do ethnic food shopping; (4) Taylor suggested a street
scene in Harlem with speakers because she recalled
having seen or listened to such a scene many times; (5)
the idea of using a minstrel scene came out of Taylor's
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research; (6) the idea of a card game scene also came
out of Taylor's research, although Taylor could not
recall who specifically suggested the scene; (7) some of
the jokes used in the play came from Taylor's research;
and (8) the characteristics of "Moms" Mabley's
personality portrayed in the play emerged from
Taylor's research. Essentially, Taylor contributed facts
and details about "Moms" Mabley's life and discussed
some of them with Childress. However, Childress was
responsible for the actual structure of the play and the
dialogue.
Childress completed the script within the six-week time
frame. Childress filed for and received a copyright for
the play in her name. Taylor produced the play at the
Green Plays Theatre in Lexington, New York, during
the 1986 summer season and played the title role. After
the play's run at the Green Plays Theatre, Taylor
planned a second production of the play at the Hudson
Guild Theatre in New York City.8 4
"At the time Childress agreed to the project, she did not have
any firm arrangements with Taylor, although Taylor had paid her
$2,500 before the play was produced."8 5 Both Taylor's and Childress'
agents sent letters back and forth with different arrangements with
respect to copyright ownership.86 Taylor's agent claimed that during
their telephone conversation the parties had agreed to the following
with respect to ownership: "The finished play shall be equally owned
and be the property of both Clarice Taylor and Alice Childress."
Childress's representative responded by saying: "It [wa]s to be
understood that pending the proper warranty clauses to be included in
the contract Miss Childress is claiming originality for her words only
84 Id.
85 Id. at 503.
86 Childress, 945 F.2d at 503.
87 Id.
54 IDEA 157 (2014)
Joint Works Under United States Copyright Law
in said script."88 Therefore, there was no clear understanding between
the two with respect to ownership or division of rights.
In 1987, the relationship between the two parties deteriorated. 89
Taylor hired another playwright to work on a "Moms" Mabley script. 90
Taylor gave the new playwright, Caldwell, a copy of the original script
from which to work. 91 A new, revised play was produced, with no
mention of Childress in any of the credits. 92 Childress sued Taylor for
copyright infringement, claiming that the copyright to her play had
been infringed by the creation and performance of the new work. 93
Taylor defended on the grounds that the work was a "joint work" and
that, as a joint author, she was free to exploit the play.94 In addition,
joint authors may not sue each other for copyright infringement. 95 The
district court ruled in favor of the playwright, Childress.96
In determining whether Taylor had infringed, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the standards for whether a work is
a "joint work." 97  Ultimately, the court came up with two
requirements: (1) that each of the parties contribute an independently
Id. (having back-and-forth letters regarding ownership, the two parties defeated the
case for mutual intent to be joint owners).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Childress, 945 F.2d at 503.
93 Id. at 504.
94 Id.
95 See Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. V. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H & Co.
KG., 510 F.3d 77, 98 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that although the Copyright Act "sets
forth express remedies available to copyright owners against infringers," the Act
"deliberately omits any comparable express or implied remedy for a co-owner
seeking [relief] from a joint copyright owner who has profited from use of the
copyright.").
96 Childress, 945 F.2d at 504.
97 Id. at 504-08.
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copyrightable contribution and (2) that the parties intended to be joint
authors when they were working on their respective contributions. 98 1
address each of these in turn.
1. Independent Copyrightable Contribution
The court noted that the issue was difficult and that the courts99
and commentators 00 were split on the issue but that the Register of
Copyrights strongly supported this independently copyrightable
contribution view, "arguing that it is required by the statutory standard
of 'authorship' and perhaps by the Constitution."101 The court then
proceeded with its own analysis:
The issue, apparently open in this Circuit, is
troublesome. If the focus is solely on the objective of
copyright law to encourage the production of creative
works, it is difficult to see why the contributions of all
joint authors need be copyrightable. An individual
creates a copyrightable work by combining a non-
98 See id.
99 The Third Circuit left it as an open issue. See Andrien v. S. Ocean City Chamber
of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1991). Other courts have required a
copyrightable contribution. See, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc.,
903 F.2d 1486, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1990); Ashton-Tate, 728 F. Supp. at 601; S.O.S.
Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318-19 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd without
consideration of this point, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1031 (1987); Kenbrooke Fabrics Inc. v. Material Things, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1039, 1044-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co.,
542 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1982); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857
(D.N.J. 1981).
100 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing NIMMER, supra note
62); Goldstein, supra note 60; WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW
116 (6th ed. 1986)).
101Id. at 506 (citing Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 and
S. 1253 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 210-11 (1989) (statement of Ralph Oman)).
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copyrightable idea with a copyrightable form of
expression; the resulting work is no less a valuable
result of the creative process simply because the idea
and the expression came from two different individuals.
Indeed, it is not unimaginable that there exists a skilled
writer who might never have produced a significant
work until some other person supplied the idea. The
textual argument from the statute is not convincing.
The Act surely does not say that each contribution to a
joint work must be copyrightable, and the specification
that there be "authors" does not necessarily require a
copyrightable contribution. "Author" is not defined in
the Act and appears to be used only in its ordinary
sense of an originator. The "author" of an
uncopyrightable idea is nonetheless its author even
though, for entirely valid reasons, the law properly
denies him a copyright on the result of his creativity.
And the Register's tentative constitutional argument
seems questionable. It has not been supposed that the
statutory grant of "authorship" status to the employer of
a work made for hire exceeds the Constitution, though
the employer has shown skill only in selecting
employees, not in creating protectable expression. 102
Despite the fact that the court found no support in the language of the
statute itself and questioned the constitutional requirement argument,
the court, nonetheless found it to be more "with the spirit of copyright"
to require that each contribution be able to stand alone as
copyrightable: 103
The insistence on copyrightable contributions by all
putative joint authors might serve to prevent some
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 507.
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spurious claims by those who might otherwise try to
share the fruits of the efforts of a sole author of a
copyrightable work, even though a claim of having
contributed copyrightable material could be asserted by
those so inclined. More important, the prevailing view
strikes an appropriate balance in the domains of both
copyright and contract law. In the absence of contract,
the copyright remains with the one or more persons
who created copyrightable material. Contract law
enables a person to hire another to create a
copyrightable work, and the copyright law will
recognize the employer as "author." Similarly, the
person with non-copyrightable material who proposes
to join forces with a skilled writer to produce a
copyrightable work is free to make a contract to
disclose his or her material in return for assignment of
part ownership of the resulting copyright. And, as with
all contract matters, the parties may minimize
subsequent disputes by formalizing their agreement in a
written contract. ("[W]ork made for hire" definition of
"specially ordered" or "commissioned" work includes
requirement of written agreement). It seems more
consistent with the spirit of copyright law to oblige all
joint authors to make copyrightable contributions,
leaving those with non-copyrightable contributions to
protect their rights through contract.104
Although the court held that a "copyrightable contribution" was the
standard, the court did not evaluate whether Taylor's contribution met
the standard.10 5  Instead the court decided the case solely on the
"intent" issue. 106
104 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
1os See generally id.
106 Childress, 945 F.2d at 508. For further discussion regarding "intent," see infra
Section 2.
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The court is exercising judicial legislation, plain and simple.
As the Supreme Court stated in Stewart v. Abend 07 : "[I]t is not our
role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve."108
Congress easily could have added the requirement of "originality" to
the "joint works" definition in section 101,109 as it did in the
definitions of "derivative works" and "collective works," as well as in
section 102(a). 110 The fact that Congress did not accept the proposed
amendments to section 101, including the requirement of a
copyrightable contribution, is further evidence that Congress did not
intend to demand that each joint owner's contribution meet the
"originality" standard. It should be noted that Congress was not
inactive in the copyright field in the late 1980s.111 Since that time
Congress has been amending the Copyright Act extensively in many
area, sometimes with lightning speed. 112
In addition, the court shows that it does not understand how the
creative process works. 113 Authors, composers, playwrights, and other
creative artists do not usually have lawyers on retainer. 114 When they
107 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
.0. Id. at 230.
109 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
110 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Copyright subsists ... in original works of
authorship .... ) (emphasis added).
111 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92, COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE U.S. AND
RELATED LAWS CONTAINED IN TITLE 17 OF THE U.S. CODE (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/titlel7/circ92.pdf.
112 Congress made nearly fifty amendments to Copyright Law between 1984 and
2010. For a complete review of the changes, see id. at v-xii.
113 See e.g., Price v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (holding moot the issue of co-ownership of two people who established a
production company, registered it as a general partnership, but failed to delineate
their ownership interests in movies they created through the production company
because the Copyright co-author equitable tolling doctrine requires due diligence).
114 See Telephone Interview with Meredith Ragains, Executive Director of Georgia
Lawyers for the Arts (Jan. 23, 2014) (noting that a very small percentage of artists
retain attorneys to represent them in legal matters).
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begin a collaborative project, they attempt to work together to create
an aesthetically good work, they do not call legal counsel first.1
Copyright ownership and use issues are the furthest things from most
of their minds at the time of creation especially complicated with
works related to the performing arts. 116
2. Intent to Be Joint Authors
The court engaged in similar judicial legislation when it
interpreted the "intent" prong:
The wording of the statutory definition appears
to make relevant only the state of mind regarding the
unitary nature of the finished work-an intention "that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole." However, an
inquiry so limited would extend joint author status to
many persons who are not likely to have been within
the contemplation of Congress. For example, a writer
frequently works with an editor who makes numerous
useful revisions to the first draft, some of which will
consist of additions of copyrightable expression. Both
intend their contributions to be merged into inseparable
parts of a unitary whole, yet very few editors and even
fewer writers would expect the editor to be accorded
115 Imagine the old Andy Hardy movies with Judy Garland and Mickey Rooney.
Can you imagine one of them saying, "Let's write a play. Hold on, I need to call my
lawyer before we get started."? I guess in those films, Andy Hardy, the character
portrayed by Mickey Rooney, could have asked his dad for help. After all, the
character of his father was a judge in the films.
116 See Tang v. Putruss, 521 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607 (E.D. Mich. 2007) ("The contract
between the parties, which is essentially just an invoice, does not indicate who is to
have authorship over the photo images."); Dockery, supra note 52, at 8 ("Copyright
ownership relating to musical works and stage plays can be more prone to challenges
than written works and photography, simply because a number of people are usually
involved in the creation of these types of works.").
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the status of joint author, enjoying an undivided half
interest in the copyright in the published work.
Similarly, research assistants may on occasion
contribute to an author some protectable expression or
merely a sufficiently original selection of factual
material as would be entitled to a copyright, yet not be
entitled to be regarded as a joint author of the work in
which the contributed material appears. What
distinguishes the writer-editor relationship and the
writer-researcher relationship from the true joint-author
relationship is the lack of intent of both participants in
the venture to regard themselves as joint authors.
Focusing on whether the putative joint authors
regarded themselves as joint authors is especially
important in circumstances, such as the instant case,
where one person (Childress) is indisputably the
dominant author of the work and the only issue is
whether that person is the sole author or she and
another (Taylor) are joint authors.1 17
Despite the fact that the court acknowledges that there is no intent
provision in the statute itself, the court attempted to fill in perceived
blanks in the statutory language by interpreting "intent" to mean, not
intent to merge the contributions, but intent to jointly own.118
There are clear problems with the "intent to be joint owners"
standards. As discussed earlier, most creative parties do not sit down
and negotiate ownership rights when they begin a project. 119 If there is
117 Childress, 945 F.2d at 507-08.
11s See Ulloa v. Universal Music and Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d. 409,
411-12, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Childress, 945 F.2d at 509) (finding no
shared intent to be joint authors when an accidental contributor dropped in on Shawn
Carter's recording session, but contribution of vocal countermelody to a song's
instrumental phase allowed copyright infringement claim to survive motion to
dismiss); Dockery, supra note 52, at 10-13.
119 See supra Section 2.
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no tangible evidence of an intention to jointly own the work, all that it
takes to defeat "joint authorship" is a disagreement at some time
regarding the rights. If one party were to say, "I did most of the work;
I should own it," halfway through the project, the intent prong would
not be met.
The court is also being overly general in dismissing the editor
and researcher situations. The facts of the case and the quantitative
and qualitative nature and substantiality of the contributions must be
considered. While not meaning to demean editors, whose
contributions are certainly valuable, edits and stylistic contributions
could be handled by either counting their contributions as legally de
minimis or by invoking the "works made for hire" doctrine. In the
cases of staff editors who work for publishing houses or magazines,
the publisher owns their work.120 In the case of the author-researcher
relationship, the contribution may be sufficient on the part of the
researcher to warrant "joint authorship" status,121 or the relationship
may be such as to also be a "work made for hire." 122 The situation
must be fact specific. For example, in Seshadri v. Kasraian, 123a
professor's graduate student was held to be a "joint author" of a journal
article with the university professor. 124 Under the facts of the case, the
120 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2012) ("the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title ... ).
121 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship,
Ownership, andAccountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2000) (advocating for
"[r]ethinking the intellectual property system in light of the increasing prevalence of
collaborative production. . . "). See also, Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse:
Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 569 (2002) (discussing
concept of authorship and property rights). But see Mark A. Lemley, Rights of
Attribution and Integrity in Online Communications, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 2, 11,
available at http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/
data/law reviews/03 ljonline law/lemley.html (noting the importance of peer
recognition for some authors who do not receive financial compensation and stating
that "for other authors, particularly those in the academic community, attribution
may be more important than the right of commercial control").
122 Childress, 945 F.2d at 507 n.2.
123 130 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997).
124 Id. at 804.
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professor acknowledged that the student authored the first draft of two
sections that occupied almost five pages of a thirteen page article, as
well as of a number of complicated graphs. 12 5 The court found the
contribution was significant.126
There is another problem with concentrating on the "intent"
prong, as the Second Circuit did in Childress: because the test has two
required elements, failure to meet one of them ends the inquiry of joint
authority. The court did not sufficiently address whether Taylor did,
indeed, contribute copyrightable material. 127 If she had, what becomes
of it? Could Taylor sue Childress for unauthorized use of
copyrightable patrons contained in the work? After all, there is
sufficient precedent holding that characters, if sufficiently developed
may, be protected. 128 Were some of the added characters protected?
In addition, did Taylor contribute "expression" that transcended
"ideas" to the plot? Did Taylor's behavior contributions give to
Childress a "nonexclusive" license to use the work? There are still
-129
many open questions.
B. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre
Childress was followed by a case in the Seventh Circuit,
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.,130 also involving a playwright and
125 Id. at 803.
126 Id. at 804-05. It is interesting to note that the court did not concentrate on the
intent prong. The professor, in that case, clearly did not intend to be a "joint author"
with his graduate student.
127 See generally Childress, 945 F.2d 500.
128 See Gaiman v. MacFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004). See generally
Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ'ns, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940); Anderson v.
Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D.Cal. 1989). But see Nichols v. Universal
Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
129 These issues will be more fully discussed, along with Thomson v. Larson, the case
involving the musical Rent, later in this article. See infra Section 2(C).
13 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
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several actors.131 Karen Erickson, a playwright, "was one of the
founders of' and wrote several plays to be produced at Trinity
Theatre.132 Between 1981 and 1991, she served in several capacities at
the Theatre, including "playwright, artistic director, actress, play
director, business manager, and member of the board of directors." 133
During rehearsals of the plays in question, the actors frequently made
suggestions that were incorporated into the plays. 134
In 1987, Trinity produced the plays and "began paying Ms.
Erickson royalties for [the] performances," crediting her as the
playwright. 13 5 In 1988, "Ms. Erickson entered into a two-year license
agreement with Trinity," also listing her as "playwright" and agreeing
to pay royalties for the two-year term of the agreement. 136 "Trinity
discontinued making royalty payments on November 15, 1990."137
Erickson registered the works in her name and sued the Theatre for
copyright infringement. 138 The Theatre alleged that it did not infringe
because it was a "joint author" along with Erickson, on the basis of the
contributions made by the actors-employees of the theatre. 13 9
The court held that in order to be "joint authors," the two-
pronged test articulated in Childress v. Taylor must be met. 140 The
court held that the actors were not "joint authors" of the plays and
affirmed the district court's injunction on performances of the plays or
131 Id. at 1063-64.
132 Id. at 1063.
133 id.
134 Id. at 1064.
135 id.
136 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1064.
137 id.
138 Id. at 1064-65
139 Id. at 1063-64. It is interesting that Trinity Theatre did not claim that it was the
statutory author of the plays under the "works made for hire" doctrine. Erickson
regularly worked for the theater for ten years in a number of capacities. It is possible
that, under the Reid factors, she would have been classified as an "employee."
140 See id. at 1071.
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displays of videotapes of the plays.141 It was clear from the facts of
the case that the playwright and the actors did not share the "intent" to
be joint authors. 142 Regarding the copyrightability of the contributions
issue, the court followed the lead articulated by Professor Paul
Goldstein that the individual contributions of collaborators must
themselves be independently copyrightable and followed by the
Second Circuit:
We agree with the Childress court's observation that the
copyrightability test "strikes an appropriate balance in
the domains of both copyright and contract law."
Section 201(b) of the Act allows any person to contract
with another to create a work and endow the employer
with authorship status under the Act. A contributor of
uncopyrightable ideas may also protect her rights to
compensation under the Act by contract. Section 201(d)
of the Act provides in part that any of the exclusive
ownership rights comprised in a copyright may be
transferred from the person who satisfied the
requirements for obtaining the copyright to one who
contracts for such rights. Thus, anyone who contributes
to the creation of a work, either as patron, employer, or
contributor of ideas, has the opportunity to share in the
profits produced by the work through an appropriate
contractual arrangement . . . . In order for the plays to be
joint works under the Act, Trinity also must show that
actors' contributions to Ms. Erickson's work could have
been independently copyrighted. Trinity cannot
establish this requirement for any of the above works.
The actors, on the whole, could not identify specific
contributions that they had made to Ms. Erickson's
works. Even when Michael Osborne was able to do so,
141 See id. at 1072-73.
142 See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1072-73.
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the contributions that he identified were not
independently copyrightable. Ideas, refinements, and
suggestions, standing alone, are not the subjects of
copyrights. Consequently, Trinity cannot establish the
two necessary elements of the copyrightability test and
its claims must fail. Trinity cannot establish joint
authorship to the plays at issue. 143
The court was a bit disingenuous by saying that "refinements
and suggestions, standing alone, are not the subject matter of
copyright." What if the "refinements and suggestions" involved
changes in dialogue? Adding dialogue or editing could be
copyrightable contributions. A better way of approaching the
"copyrightability" issue is to look at either a "more than de minimis
contribution" or a genuine contribution" alluded to in some of the
House Reports that accompanied proposed amendments to the
statute. 144 While "more than de minimis" and "genuine contribution"
are, admittedly, a bit ambiguous and would still require judicial
interpretation, those standards are more intellectually honest than an
outright rejection of copyrightability for the contributions of actors
made to improve upon a written script.
143 Id. at 1071-73 (citations omitted). Supporting the need for intent, the court
references a citation from Childress. See id. at n. 10 (citing 945 F.2d at 509)
("Childress was asked to write a play about 'Moms' Mabley and did so. To facilitate
her writing task, she accepted the assistance that Taylor provided, which consisted
largely of furnishing the results of research concerning the life of 'Moms' Mabley.
As the actress expected to portray the leading role, Taylor also made some incidental
suggestions, contributing ideas about the presentation of the play's subject and
possibly some minor bits of expression. But there is no evidence that these aspects
of Taylor's role ever evolved into more than the helpful advice that might come from
the cast, the directors, or the producers of any play. A playwright does not so easily
acquire a co-author.").
See H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120
(1976).
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C Thomson v. Larson
In 1998, the Second Circuit was presented with another "joint
works" case-this time a high-profile one involving the hit Broadway
musical Rent.145 In Thomson v. Larson,146 the issue before the court
was whether a dramaturg who was brought in to make changes to the
play prior to the Broadway opening was a "joint author." 14 7 The facts
of the case are as follows:
Rent, the Pulitzer Prize and Tony Award-
winning Broadway modern musical based on Puccini's
opera La Boheme, began in 1989 as the joint project of
Billy Aronson and composer Jonathan Larson.
Aronson and Larson collaborated on the work until
their amicable separation in 1991. At that time, Larson
obtained Aronson's permission to develop the play on
his own. By written agreement, Larson promised that
the title would always be "RENT a rock opera by
Jonathan Larson. Original concept and additional
lyrics by Billy Aronson." In return, Aronson agreed
that he would "not . . . be considered [an] active
collaborator or co-author of Rent."
In the summer of 1992, Larson's Rent script was
favorably received by James Nicola, artistic director of
the New York Theatre Workshop ("NYTW"), a non-
145 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
146 id.
147 Id. One issue for the court to consider was whether $2,000 is fair compensation
for dramatalogical services for a Broadway-bound musical. Id. For a thorough
discussion of Thomson, see Alvin Deutsch, La Boheme-Revisited: Thomson v.
Larson-An Unhurried View, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 652 (1998). See also
Faye Buckalew, Joint Authorship in the Second Circuit: A Critique of the Law in the
Second Circuit Following Childress v. Taylor and as Exemplified in Thompson v.
Larson, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 545 (1998).
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profit theater company in the East Village Larson
continued to develop and revise the
"workshop version" of his Rent script. In the spring of
1993, Nicola urged Larson to allow the NYTW to hire a
playwright or a bookwriter to help revamp the storyline
and narrative structure of the play. But Larson
"absolutely, vehemently and totally rejected [Nicola's]
suggestion of hiring a bookwriter" and "was insistent
on making Rent entirely his own project." Larson
received a grant in the spring of 1994 to pay for a
workshop production of Rent, which was presented to
the public in the fall of 1994 in a series of ten staged
performances produced by the NYTW and directed by
Michael Greif. "[T]he professional consensus
concerning the show, after the studio production, was
that it was, at a minimum, very promising and that it
needed a great deal of work." Artistic Director Nicola
once again suggested to Larson that he consider
working with a bookwriter, which Larson "adamantly
and steadfastly refused, consistently emphasizing his
intention to be the only author of RENT."
In May 1995, in preparation for Rent's off-
Broadway opening, scheduled for early 1996, Larson
agreed to the NYTW's hiring of Lynn Thomson, a
professor of advanced playwriting at New York
148- - -University, as a dramaturg to assist him in clarifying
the storyline of the musical. Thomson signed a contract
with the NYTW, in which she agreed to provide her
services with the workshop production from May 1,
1995, through the press opening, scheduled for early
February of 1996. The agreement stated that
1s "Dramaturgs provide a range of services to playwrights and directors in
connection with the production and development of theater pieces. According to
Thomson's testimony, the role of the dramaturg 'can include any number of the
elements that go into the crafting of a play,' such as 'actual plot elements, dramatic
structure, character details, themes, and even specific language."' Id. at n.5.
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Thomson's ""responsibilities shall include, but not be
limited to: Providing dramaturgical assistance and
research to the playwright and director." In exchange,
the NYTW agreed to pay "a fee" of $2000, "[i]n full
consideration of the services to be rendered" and to
provide for billing credit for Thomson as "Dramaturg."
The Thomson/NYTW agreement was silent as to any
copyright interests or any issue of ownership with
respect to the final work.149
In the summer and fall of 1995, Thomson and
Larson worked extremely intensively together on the
show. For the most part, the two worked on the script
alone in Larson's apartment. Thomson testified that
revisions to the text of Rent didn't begin until early
August 1995. Larson himself entered all changes
directly onto his computer, where he kept the script,
and Thomson made no contemporaneous notes of her
specific contributions of language or other structural or
thematic suggestions. Thomson alludes to the "October
Version" of Rent as the culmination of her collaborative
efforts with Larson. That new version was
characterized by experts as "a radical transformation of
the show."
A "sing-through" of the "October Version" of
Rent took place in early November 1995. On
November 3, 1995, Larson signed a contract with the
NYTW for ongoing revisions to Rent. This agreement
149 It should be noted that the Agreement was with the NYTW, and not with Larson
himself. See id. at 197. Conceivably, then, claims should have been against NYTW.
See Deutsch, supra note 187, at 658. There also could have been a "works made for
hire claim" made by NYTW with respect to Thomson's work. It should be noted that
the only way that "work made for hire" could have been claimed would have been
under section 101(1) by applying the Reid factors. Section 101(2) could not have
been used, for there was no writing stating that the work was a "work made for hire."
Moreover, plays are not in the enumerated categories in section 101(2). See 17
U.S.C. § 101.
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identified Larson as the "Author" of Rent and made no
reference to Thomson. The contract incorporated by
reference an earlier draft author's agreement that set
forth the terms that would apply if the NYTW opted to
produce Rent. The earlier draft author's agreement gave
Larson approval rights over all changes in text,
provided that any changes in text would become his
property, and assured him of billing as "sole author."15 0
The final dress rehearsal was held on January
24, 1996. Just hours after it ended, Larson died
suddenly of an aortic aneurysm. Over the next few
weeks, Nicola, Greif, Thomson, and musical director
Tim Weil worked together to fine-tune the script. The
play opened off-Broadway on February 13, 1996, to
rave reviews. On February 23, 1996, Rent's move to
Broadway was announced. Since its opening on
Broadway on April 29, 1996, the show has been "an
astounding critical, artistic, and commercial
success.". . . Thomson approached ... the surviving
members of Jonathan Larson's family, to request a
percentage of the royalties derived from the play. In a
letter to the Larson family, dated April 8, 1996,
Thomson stated that she believed Larson, had he lived,
would have offered her a "small percentage of his
royalties to acknowledge the contribution I made." In
reply, the Larson heirs offered Thomson a gift of 1% of
the author's royalties. 151
When negotiations between Thomson and the heirs
disintegrated, Thomson brought suit, claiming that she was a
150 On November 30, 1995, Larson signed an option deal with the Broadway
producers. This contract defined the royalty payments and other entitlements that
would flow to Larson as the "Author." Thomson, 147 F.3d at n.6.
151 Id. at 197-98.
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"co-author" of Rent.152 She also alleged in the alternative that
she never transferred any of her rights.153
The district court trial was a bench trial in front of Judge
Kaplan. 154 After hearing the testimony of two dozen witnesses, as
well as reviewing thousands of pages of documentary evidence, Judge
Kaplan issued his decision from the bench, holding that Thomson was
not a "joint author" and dismissing the complaint. 15 5  Thomson
appealed, arguing again that she was a "joint author." 156  In the
alternative, she asked for a determination of whether the district court's
holding that she was not a joint author meant that she was the holder of
all exclusive rights to her contributions.1 5 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed the Childress factors
in turn. With respect to the independently copyrightable
contribution requirement, the court agreed with the district court in
that Thomson had made "at least some non-de minimis copyrightable
contribution." 159  After deciding that there was a sufficient
copyrightable contribution to satisfy the first prong of the Childress
test, the court went on to the intent prong.160
152 Id. at 198.
153 Id. Under section 204 of the Copyright Act of 1976, all "transfers" must be in
writing. See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2012). See also, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "transfer"
to include assignments and exclusive licenses, but expressly excluding nonexclusive
licenses).
151 Id. at 199.
155Id.
156 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 199.
157 Id.
151 Id. at 200-05.
159 Id. at 200-01 n. 14 In the district court opinion delivered from the bench, "Judge
Kaplan stated that 'there are lines in Rent that originated verbatim with Ms.
Thomson. I don't think that they amount to 9%, and certainly not zero. There is
probably enough there that it is not de minimis.' Id.
160 Id. at 200-01.
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The court viewed the Childress intent prong as requiring the
putative collaborators to, "'entertain in their minds the concept of joint
authorship.' This requirement of mutual intent recognizes that, since
co-authors are afforded equal rights in the co-authored work, the
'equal sharing of rights should be reserved for relationships in which
all participants fully intent to be joint authors.',, 16 1 As the court did in
Childress, the Second Circuit ignored the express statutory language
and stated "'[i]t is not enough that they intend to merge their
contributions into one unitary work."' 162 The court then proceeded to
look to "factual indicia" to determine whether the primary author,
Larson, had any intent to share authorship with anyone else. 163 Factors
that the court considered as evidence of Larson's intent not to be a joint
author were: (1) decision-making authority; (2) billing; (3) written
agreements with third parties; and (4) additional evidence. 164
With respect to decision-making authority, evidence showed
that Larson wanted all creative control and had expressly negotiated
for final authority over any changes. 165  In addition, Larson's
agreement with NYTW stated that any changes to the script would
become Larson's property.166 With respect to billing, the court first
stated the proposition that "a writer's attribution of the work to herself
alone is 'persuasive proof . .. that she intended this particular piece to
represent her own individual authorship' and is 'prima facie proof that
[the] work was not intended to be joint'167 The court noted that every
copy of a script brought to the court's attention said, "Rent, by
Jonathan Larson."168 In addition, both the Off-Broadway and the
161 Id. at 201 (citing Childress, 945 F.2d at 509).
162 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 (citing Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F.
Supp. 743, 764 (D.P.R. 1995) (following the Childress standard)).
163 id.
164 Id. at 200-05.
165 Id. at 202.
166 Id. at 203.
167 Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1320 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
168 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 204.
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Broadway copies of playbill identified the play as being "by Jonathan
Larson," while Thomson was listed as "Dramaturg." 16 9 The court
affirmed the district court's conclusion that Larson was the sole
author. 170 With respect to written agreements with third parties, the
court found that all agreements with NYTW stated that Larson was to
be listed as the "sole author."1 7 1 This, too, was found to be evidence
that Larson did not have any intent to share authorship with anyone
else. 172 With respect to additional evidence, the court, relying on
Larson's earlier discussions and negotiations with Aaronson, found
that Larson completely understood the concept of "joint
authorship." 173 His agreements with Aaronson expressly stated that
Aaronson would "not .. . be considered an active collaborator or co-
author of Rent."174 Based upon all of the evidence, the mutual intent
to be "joint authors" was not found and Thomson was not found to be
a joint author.17 5
Regarding Thomson's claim of having the exclusive rights in
and to her contributions, based upon the court's finding that she had
made a copyrightable contribution, the court was able to skirt the
issue. 17 6 Although the court acknowledged that "[u]nder section 106,
she would have the right to enjoin any use of her contributions in any
stage production, book, cast album, or motion picture," the court held
because Thomson brought up the issue for the first time on appeal and
did not address it at the district court level, the issues were "not
properly before us, [and] we express no opinion on them."177
169 Id. at 204-05.
170 Id. at 204.
171 Id. at 204.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 204-05.
174 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 205.
175 Id. at 206-07.
176 See id.
177 Id. at 206.
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D. Aalmuhammed v. Lee
Another co-authorship claim centered on the award winning
movie Malcolm X directed by Spike Lee and starring Denzel
Washington.17 8  In Aalmuhammed v. Lee, the court had to decide,
"Who, in the absence of contract, can be considered an author of a
movie?" 179 The case is interesting because it is decided on the grounds
of "authorship," despite the fact that Aalmuhammed clearly made a
"copyrightable contribution" to the movie.180 In doing so, it moves
away from the Childress v. Taylor standard. 81
After Lee co-wrote the screenplay and Washington signed on
as its star, Washington asked Jefri Aalmuhammed to assist him in his
preparation due to Aalmuhammed's extensive knowledge of Malcolm
X and Islam. 182  "Aalmuhammed, a devout Muslim,... [had]
previously written, directed, and produced a lesser known
documentary film about Malcolm X. Aalmuhammed joined
Washington on the movie set" to review religious and historical
authenticity of the scenes. 183  Using his expertise, Aalmuhammed
revised parts of the script, assisted with Arabic translations in Egypt,
voiced some voice-overs, translated Arabic into English for subtitles,
"and edited parts of the movie during post production." 184 Some of his
revisions were included in the released version of the film while others
were not. Significantly, "he wrote [two] scenes relating to Malcolm
X's Hajj pilgrimage that were enacted in the movie.186 Aalmuhammed
17s Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
179 Id. at 1232.
Iso See id. at 1235-36.
See id.
1Id. at 1229-31 ("Coaching of actors, to be copyrightable, must be turned into an
expression in a form subject to copyright.").
183 Id. at 1229-30.
1 4Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1230.
185 id.
186 Id. at 1231.
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cashed a $25,000 check from Lee, but kept a $100,000 check from
Washington.1 17  Although Aalmuhammed was turned down for a
writing credit, the film listed him as "Islamic Technical Consultant" in
its November 1992 release. In November 1995, he applied for a
copyright in the film as "co-creator, co-writer, and co-director of the
movie". 189  "The Copyright Office issued him a "Certificate of
Registration," but advised him . . . that his claims conflict with
previous registrations of the film." 190  Later that month,
Aalmuhammed sued for a declaratory judgment of co-ownership in the
movie and an accounting of profits, along with other claims. 191
In attempting to justify the authorship standard of Burrow-
Giles' 92 with the originality standard of copyrightablity of Feist
Publications,193 Burrow-Giles proved more useful. 194 The court began
by analyzing the theories of author as the originator, Chaucer's first
cause "Author of Nature," and "auteur" theory suggesting the director
able to impose his artistic judgments on the film as author. 195
"[Authoring] involves originating, making, producing, as the inventive
or master mind, the thing which is to be protected. ... 196 The author
117 Id. at 1230. By taking the time to write checks for $25,000 and $100,000
respectively, Spike Lee and Denzel Washington could have also taken the time to
write agreements providing the rights and responsibilities of Aalmuhammed. It also
would have ended the case.
... Id. at 1231.
189 Id. at 1230.
190 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1230 (internal quotations omitted).
191 Id. Although the ninth circuit held that joint authorship was not present, it
remanded for further proceedings of Aalmuhammed's quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment claims. Id. at 1237.
192 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884).
193 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
194 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233-34.
195 Id. at 1232.
196 Id. at 1233 (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61).
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"really represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea, fancy, or
imagination. . . " when considering the nature of authorship. 19 7 After
considering the "copyrightable contribution," which gives joint
authorship status to one who creates "some minimal level of
creativity" or "originality" standard sufficient to create a copyrightable
"work," the court held that that standard would be unmanageable in
the film context.198 Because so many people on a film set make
substantial creative contributions, no one working on the set could be
distinguished from another: 199
Everyone from the producer and director to casting
director, costumer, hairstylist, and "best boy" gets listed
in the movie credits because all of their creative
contributions really do matter. It is striking in Malcolm
X how much the person who controlled the hue of the
lighting contributed, yet no one would use the word
"author" to denote that individual's relationship to the
movie. A creative contribution does not suffice to
establish authorship of the movie.200
The court used the reasoning in its opinion to reach a practical
result "consistent" with the Second and Seventh Circuits, although
those decisions were not based "on the word 'authors' in the
statute." 20 1 Those circuits "have likewise concluded that contribution
of independently copyrightable material to a work intended to be an
inseparable whole will not suffice to establish authorship of a joint
work."202
197 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
198 Id. at 1233, 1236 (citing Feist, 449 U.S. at 345).
199 Id. at 1233.
2 00 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233.
201 Id. at 1233-34.
2 02 Id. at 1233.
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In combining the "author" theory of Burrows-Giles and the
"thoughtful opinion" theory in Thomson, the court enumerated three
factors as criteria for joint authorship in the absence of contract.203
First, and most important, the "author superintends the work by
exercising control."204 This "inventive or master mind" will "create[]
or give[] effect to the idea" through "actually form[ing] the picture by
putting the persons in position, and arranging the place where the
people are to be."205 A master mind is "the man who is the effective
206
cause of that" creation.26 Second, "putative coauthors make objective
manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors. . . . Third, "the
audience appeal of the work turns on both contributions and 'the share
of each in its success cannot be appraised."'
2 08
Because the court found the "master mind's" control of
paramount importance, Aalmuhammed, even in making substantial
contributions to the film, including two full scenes, was not one of its
authors. 209 The independently copyrightable contribution requirement
gave way to constitutional authorship under the copyright clause: "We
hold that authorship is required under the statutory definition of a joint
work, and that authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable
203 See id. at 1234 (citing 111 U.S. at 61; Thomson, 147 F.3d. at 195).
204 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (internal quotations omitted).
205 Id. at 1233-34.
2 06 Id. at 1234.
207 id.
208 Id. (quoting Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 140
F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944), modified by, 140 F.2d 268 (1944)). The
Aalmuhammed court did not explicitly apply the third factor in determining
authorship in this case. See id. Presumably, this factor refers to the inseparability
when merging parts into a "unitary whole." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a joint
work as being "prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole").
2 09 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235-36.
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and copyrightable contribution." 210  Because Warner Brothers and
Spike Lee controlled the making of the film, "Aalmuhammed did not
at any time have superintendence of the work."2 11 Instead, the court
likened him to Larson's dramaturg, making "extremely helpful
recommendations," which Spike Lee could freely refuse.212 Although
Aalmuhammed showed he made valuable contributions to the movie,
those contributions were subject to a supervisor's discretion and did
not amount to enough for co-authorship of a joint work.213 Moreover,
no one involved made any objective manifestations of intent to be co-
authors.214 The court feared that "progress would be retarded rather
than promoted, if an author could not consult with others and adopt
their useful suggestions without sacrificing sole ownership of the
work."215
In sum, although Aalmuhammed presented evidence
suggesting an independently copyrightable contribution which those
involved intended to be merged into interdependent parts of the movie
as a unitary whole, he was not one of the film's "authors." While the
master mind theory might prove more useful in the film-making
context because of the plethora of the court's feared "claim-jumping"
contributors, it is at odds with the copyrightable contribution
requirement added by the Second and Seventh Circuits.
2 10 Id. at 1232.
2 11 Id. at 1235.
212 id.
213 See id. at 1236.
214 Id. at 1235. Even Spike Lee would not be considered a co-author and co-owner
with Warner Brothers because he had signed a work for hire agreement. See id. The
court noted this fact to illustrate the illogical presumption that Warner Brothers,
"while not wanting to permit Lee to own the copyright, intended to share ownership
with individuals like Aalmuhammed who work under Lee's control. . . ." Id.
215 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235-36 ((stating that if creative contribution
alone sufficed to establish authorship "[c]laimjumping[sic] by research assistants,
editors, and former spouses, lovers and friends ... [would] endanger authors who
talked with people about what they were doing").
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E. Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau
In a case in which a writer who contributed only 10%, and was
not the mastermind, as in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, the Seventh Circuit
reversed a summary judgment finding of sole authorship by granting
joint work status in a doo-wop ditty.216 Cheryl Janky and Henry Farag
were two "members of 'Stormy Weather,' an Indiana-based group
revitalizing the nation's a cappella doo-wop sound." 217 The Lake
County Convention and Visitor's Bureau attempted to attract visitors
to the "pristine beachfront along the Indiana Dunes National
Lakeshore" by "commission[ing] a tune singing the county's
praises."218 After hearing about the Bureau's interest in a song to
represent Lake County, Farag suggested the band give it a try.219
"Janky took the initiative," "writing the music and lyrics for a tune she
called 'Wonders of Indiana.'" 220 When the song was complete in May
1999, she registered the copyright as a work of sole authorship.221
However, when she showed it to Farag, he recommended focusing the
lyrics more on Lake County in particular, "includ[ing] references to
the area as 'Chicago's neighboring south shore' and to its ethnic
diversity."222 Although Janky stated that Farag's recommendations
"accounted for [only] ten percent of the lyrical content," she filed a
new copyright registration in December 1999 listing Farag as co-
author of the "joint work", and "filed a document with the American
216 Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 363-64
(7th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2010).
2 17 Id. at 359 & n.2.
2 18 Id. at 358.
2 19 Id. at 359.
220 id.
221 id.
222 Janky, 576 F.3d at 359-60.
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Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) stating that
Farag held a [ten] percent 'ownership share."' 223
Janky, Farag, and the rest of Stormy Weather recorded a demo
224of the song and produced a music video to present to the Bureau.
The Bureau, satisfied with the great marketing tool, used the video and
song in exchange for the group's costs of production.225 They debuted
the song December 1, 1999, with a live performance at the Bureau.226
The Bureau also purchased 1,500 copies of the album on which the
song ultimately appeared to resell at the visitor's center.227
Yet, a mere three years later, Janky changed her mind. 22 8 "On
July 15, 2003, [she] filed yet another copyright registration form,
ostensibly to correct the 'mistake' she had made" in placing Farag's
name on the registration form.229 Instead of crediting him as a joint
author, she listed Farag on the registration "as an indication of [her]
gratitude ... and to demonstrate that [she] appreciated every little bit of
support."230 At some point, she also informed "the Bureau that she
was the exclusive owner." 23 1 Farag, however, contended his lyrical
changes were not de minimis, but "significant" and corresponded with
further revisions to the melody.232 Because "the Bureau did not stop
2 23 Id. at 360.
224 id.
225 Janky, 576 F.3d at 360 (Stormy Weather "decided the publicity generated from
the Bureau's use of the material would be payment enough," so "Farag issued a
nonexclusive license to" the Bureau).
226 id.
227 d.
228 id.
229 id.
230 Id. at 360.
231 Janky, 576 F.3d at 360.
232 id.
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using the tune," Janky filed a lawsuit against it for copyright
233infringement in October 2003.
At trial in the Northern District of Indiana, Janky contended
she composed the song and never gave the Bureau permission to use
it.234 The Bureau countered that she was only a co-author; Farag, as
235the other songwriter, had the authority to license its use. However,
the court held that Farag's contribution did not rise to the level of a
contribution that could, on its own, be subject to copyright
* 236protection. The court found there was not a genuine issue of
material fact to reach the intent element as "contemporaneous input by
more than one party alone does not satisfy the intent requirement." 237
After the district court granted Janky partial summary judgment on
sole authorship, a jury awarded her $100,000.238
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit evaluated whether Janky was
truly the only author.239  Because "'joint authors hold undivided
interests in [the] work, despite any differences in each other's
contribution' . . . each author may use or license the joint work."2 4 0
First, Judge Evans evaluated whether Farag and Janky intended to
create a joint work by intending to be joint authors at the time of
creation. 24 1 The court cited Erickson when explaining that "the intent
233 Id. The complaint alleged that as the sole author of the work to the exclusion of
Farag, the exclusive license granted by him to the Bureau was without effect, and the
use was therefore illegal. Id. at 360-61.
234 id.
2 35 Id. at 358.
2 36 See id. at 361.
237 Janky v. Farag, 2006 WL 842391, at *7-10, No 3:05-CV-217PRC, (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 29, 2006), rev'd, 576 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 559 U.S. 992
(2010).
238 Janky, 576 F.3d at 358.
2 39 Id. at 361.
240 Id (citing Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068).
2 41 Id. at 362.
Volume 54 - Number 2
201
202 IDEA - The Intellectual Property Law Review
prong does not have to do with the collaborators' intent to recognize
each other as co-authors for purposes of copyright law; the focus is on
the parties' intent to work together in the creation of a single product,
not on the legal consequences of that collaboration."242
Here, unlike Erickson, Farag instead was entitled to summary
judgment because the song was a product of them both.243 Judge
Evans went so far as to note that "Farag wielded considerable control
over what the song finally looked like; one could even say he
demanded the changes."244 But stronger still, Janky named Farag as
co-author on the copyright registration and deemed the song a "joint
work."24 5 Although the court characterizes her recanting as a "post
hoc rationalization" of her actions, like in Erickson, "crediting another
person as a co-author is strong evidence of intent to create a joint
work."246 Her affidavits contesting this intent were "at odds with the
significant contributions made by Farag" and her voluntary decision to
- 247list him on the registration form.
242 Id. at 362 (emphasis added). See Dockery, supra note 52, at 9 (stating this
"appears to refute the notion that the collaborators share a mutual intent to be
coauthors of the song. Under this view of intent, for example, anytime two musicians
make a recording, the intent element is met simply by the act of playing together and
recording their combined performance").
243 Janky, 576 F.3d at 362.
244 Id. But see id. at 364-65 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue of Farag's
intent and control is far from clear on the record and thus the issue should not be
resolved on summary judgment for either party. Indeed, Farag's affirmative
defenses stating that Janky did not own the copyrights at issue undermines the
Bureau's claim that Farag intended to create a joint work with her).
245 Id.; Dockery, supra note 52 (interpreting the court's evaluation of the intent
element and stating: "The notion that collaborators share a joint intent that their parts
be merged led to the court's finding that the intent element of authorship should be
found in the subjective belief of the collaborators. The court recognized that how the
putative authors regarded themselves in relation to the work was a key factor in
ascertaining whether the intent element of Section 101 is satisfied.").
246 Janky, 576 F.3d at 362.
247 Id. (The court quotes Childress in noting that billing credit, although not decisive
"helpfully serves to focus the factfinder's attention on how the parties implicitly
regarded their undertaking"); see also Corwin v. Quinonez, 858 F. Supp. 2d 903,
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Second, the court examined Farag's contributions to test
whether they were independently copyrightable.248 Judge Evans noted
the Gaiman exception applies only if the nature of the creative process
requires that none of the constituent parts could pass the test of
copyrightablility alone.249 Moreover, Erickson requires a greater
contribution by each author than demanded by Nimmer's de minimis
test.250 Here, Gaimen's exception did not apply because Janky's work
was copyrightable before Farag supplied his contributions.251 Once
again, the situation "differ[ed] considerably from Erikson" because
Farag's contributions were "concrete expressions and thus pass the test
of copyrightability where mere ideas fail."252 Before Farag became
involved, "the song [only] celebrated the charm of Indiana." 2 53
Because Farag shifted the focus to Lake County, even his ten percent
changes to the lyrics were significant enough to impact "not only ...
the final sound, but also ... its commercial viability."254 The Bureau
had no reason to embrace the song without Farag's input and
refocus.255 The court recognized it was a "close case" and the need to
limit the contributions of every collaborative contributor or else
"copyright would explode."256 However, "the very purpose of
n.I1 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (distinguishing Janky, which involved a "clear concession of
joint authorship," by filing the copyright registration listing the co-author as joint
author and the work as a joint work).
248 Janky, 576 F.3d at 363.
2Id. at 362 n.4 (noting that the Gaiman exception applied to the specific particular
creative process in making a comic book involving a writer, penciler, inker, and
colorist); see also Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
250 Janky, 576 F.3d at 362.
2 51 Id. at 362 n.4.
252Id. at 363 (citing Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658).
253 id.
254 id.
255 See Janky, 576 F.3d at 363.
256 Id. (quoting Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658).
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copyright law is to promote the progress of the arts and sciences... a
purposes that is defeated if important contributions are denied
copyright protection." 257 Because "copyrightability is always an issue
of law," the Seventh Circuit thus reversed and granted summary
258judgment in favor of the Bureau.
Although the majority emphasized its continued rejection and
scorn of Professor Nimmer's "de minimis" test, as the dissent notes,
the record before it leaves scant reason to find for summary judgment
in favor of either party.25 9 Farag's ten percent contribution seems to
be the only concrete evidence of a copyrightable contribution. 260 The
intent prong is primarily met because of Janky's snafu in registering
the song as a joint work co-authored by both.261 The majority doesn't
mention Farag's intent, other than his wielding "considerable control
over what the song finally looked like" and positing that he must have
"demanded the changes." 262 However, his intent seems more aligned
with that of an editor's revisions to ensure content has the greatest
"commercial viability." Although the majority notes that Farag
contributed "concrete expressions" that pass the test of
copyrightability, the ten percent lyrical contributions, due to their
"significan[ce]," were both quantitatively and qualitatively more than
263de minimis. It is a wonder the Seventh Circuit is stretching so hard
the reject Nimmer's suggestion based on precedence when its opinions
seem to be at least subconsciously embracing it.
257Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8).
258Id. at 363-64 (citing Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 568).
259 Id. at 365 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
260 See id. at 360.
261 Dockery, supra note 52 at 9 (stating that the Janky court "seemed to cast off an
investigation into whether the putative authors shared a subjective mutual intent to
create a joint work and merely focused on the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the song ... instead of analyzing the legal consequences of collaboration,
the focus is on the collaborators' intent to work together to create a single product").
262 See Janky, 576 F.3d at 362.
263 See id. at 363.
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E Gaiman v. McFarlane
Judge Posner followed the statutory rule, instead of the
"copyrightable contribution" in Gaiman v. McFarlane.264 He deviated
from Aalmuhammed when, instead of disregarding a co-creator's
independent contribution, which satisfies the copyright originality
standard as in Aalmuhammed, he acknowledged that in merging parts
into an inseparable whole, the two parts cannot always be torn apart
into independent units that can satisfy the copyrightability tests on
265their own.
The parties of the case "are both celebrated figures in the world
of comic books." 266 While Neil Gaiman solely writes scripts, Todd
McFarlane writes, illustrates, and publishes comic books.267 In 1992,
McFarlane formed his own publishing house and began publishing a
series entitled Spawn. 26 8  The title character, Al Simmons, is a
"Hellspawn": an officer in the army of the damned preparing to
someday launch an attack against Heaven.269 After his death,
Simmons entered a Faustian pact with the devil to return to the living
to see his widow and avenge his murder. 270 After early issues of the
series were criticized for bad writing, McFarlane invited four writers,
including Gaiman, to contribute an issue of Spawn. 271 Although their
only contract was oral, Gaiman wrote the script for Spawn issue No. 9
264 See generally Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 644.
265 See id. at 658-59.
2 66 Id. at 649.
267 id.
268 id.
269 id.
270 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 649.
271 d.
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in exchange for McFarlane's assurance to treat him "better than the big
guys" did.272
Gaiman introduced three new characters in his script for Spawn
27327No. 9: Medieval Spawn, Angela,274  and Count Nicholas
Cogliostro. 275 "Gaiman described, named, and wrote the dialogue for
them, but McFarlane drew them." 276 "Olden Days Spawn," as Gaiman
referred to the character, rides up on a huge horse wearing the mask
and Spawn suit "reminiscent of a suit of armour" of the Middle
Ages.277 Although he attempts to help a damsel in apparent distress
with credibly medieval colloquialisms, he is quickly dispatched by
Angela, the "warrior angel and villain." 278 McFarlane told Gaiman he
wanted a "wisened [sic] sage" character to inform and assimilate
Spawn.279 Gaiman created an "old man" character to educate spawn
280
about the extent of the super powers. Spawn would first meet
Colgiostro as a homeless "drunken bum," but later realize he is "some
kind of mysterious stranger who knows things." 28 1 Gaiman described
him as "a really old bum, a skinny, blading old man, with a grubby
272 Id. Gaiman had previously worked for D.C. Comics and Marvel Comics under
work for hire agreements, which established ownership of copyrights in the
employer and did not entitle Gaiman to royalty payments from derivative works such
as action figures. Id. at 649-50 & 656.
273 Gaiman referred to this character "Olden Days Spawn," a 13th century version of
the current-day Al Simmons. Id. at 657 & 661. McFarlane named him "Medieval
Spawn" in later issues to which Gaiman did not contribute. Id. at 661.
274Id. at 650-51. McFarlane conceded joint ownership in Angela presumably
because Gaiman was asked and wrote three additional issues as a "mini-series" to
develop the character. Id.
2 75 Id. at 650.
276 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 650.
2 77 Id. at 657.
278 id.
2 79 Id. at 657-58.
280 Id. at 658.
281 id.
54 IDEA 157 (2014)
Joint Works Under United States Copyright Law 207
grayish-yellow beard, like a skinny santa clause" whom "calls himself
Count Nicholas Cagliostro."282 McFarlane, dissatisfied with the
description, "which made Cogliostro sound like a wino," drew him "as
an old man with a long grey beard who faintly resembles Moses."283
Spawn No. 9 was a huge success and sold more than a million
copies.284 McFarlane paid Gaiman $100,000 for his work on No. 9,285
$3,300 for his contribution to No. 26 to form a bridge to the Angela
286
mini-series, and more than $30,000 for the Angela series. In 1995,
after McFarlane created a toy company to manufacture action figures
of the Spawn characters including Medieval Spawn, he sent Gaiman a
check for $20,000, which the court assumes to be royalties from the
toy sales.287 Later, McFarlane licensed the publication of paperback
books reprinting the series.288 The books carry a copyright notice
similar to his previous comics, except the addition that "all related
characters" were copyrighted by McFarlane.289
282 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658.
28 31 d. at 657-58.
284 Id. at 651.
285 Id. Gaiman testified that he would have expected to receive an equivalent amount
from DC Comics "had he written the script of Spawn No. 9 for that company as a
work made for hire." Id. Although McFarlane did not argue that telling Gaiman that
he would treat him "better than the big guys" might create a work for hire
relationship, the court held that no such relationship existed because there was no
written agreement and Gaiman was not an employee of McFarlane. Id. at 650.
286 Id. at 651. The Angela series was published in 1994. Id.
287 Id. Judge Posner refers to these derivative works as "statuettes." See id. Because
toy companies, children, and adults tend to refer to character toys as "action figures,"
so will this author.
288 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 651.
289 Id. McFarlane defended Gaiman's co-ownership claim on the ground that the
statute of limitations had expired through copyright notice on publication and
copyright registration. Id. at 652. The court found that Gaiman appropriately filed
suit within one month prior to the 3-year deadline, based on a final letter from
McFarlane after negotiations dissolved. Id. at 655. The operative statement "all
rights to Medieval Spawn and Cogliostro shall continue to be owned by Todd
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McFarlane first requested protection of a written contract in
2901996, after learning that McFarlane might sell his enterprise.
Through desultory negotiations, the parties reached a tentative
agreement that McFarlane would pay royalties on the action figures,
"but Gaiman would exchange his rights in Medieval Spawn and
Cogliostro for McFarlane's rights in another comic book character,
Miracleman." 2 91 Thus, in '1997 and 1998, McFarlane sent Gaiman
royalty checks totaling about $16,000 . . . , with royalty reports that
referred to Gaiman as "co-creator" of Medieval Spawn, Angela, and
Cogiostro."292 In 1999, McFarlane sent a letter officially rescinding all
previous offers while offering a take it or leave it deal.293 Later,
Gaiman filed suit seeking "a declaration that he is a co-owner" of the
294three characters and an accounting of profits. A jury returned a
295
verdict for Gaiman. At the time of trial, Spawn was up to issue No.
120 with a progeny of derivative works, many of which "include[d] all
three characters to which Gaiman contributed." 296
On appeal, Judge Posner questioned whether Gaiman's
contribution to the comic book characters in quest gave him a
copyright interest in them.297 McFarlane argued that Medieval Spawn
and Cogliostro were not copyrightable either because Gaiman
contributed merely unexpressed ideas, or because they are
McFarlane Productions" effected an unambiguous renunciation of Gaiman's
ownership rights thus starting the limitations clock. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
2 90 Id. at 651.
291 id.
292 id.
2 93 Id. at 652.
294 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 652.
2 95 Id. at 648.
296Id. at 652 (noting that the derivative works included "posters, trading cards,
clothing," action figures, "an animated series on HBO, video games, and a motion
picture").
297 Id. at 652.
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commonplace stock characters.298 In recognizing the rules that people
who contribute merely non-expressive elements to a work are not
copyright owners and some of the original expression by a co-author
must be independently copyrightable, Judge Posner decided Gaiman's
contributions were more than just editorial suggestions, saying:
But where two or more people set out to create a
character jointly in such mixed media as comic books
and motion pictures and succeed in creating a
copyrightable character, it would be paradoxical if
though the result of their joint labors had more than
enough originality and creativity to be copyrightable, no
one could claim copyright. That would be peeling the
- 299onion until it disappeared.
Posner distinguished his decision from anomalous precedent
because those decisions "weren't thinking of the case in which [a
contribution] couldn 't stand alone because of the nature of the
particular creative process that had produced it."300 Before the court
was a different creative process involving the joint work of four artists:
the writer, the penciler, the inker, and the colorist "with each
contributing too little to have by his contribution alone carried the
stock character over the line into copyright land." 3 01 "The finished
298 Id at 657. Recognizing that McFarlane's arguments regarding the characters'
copyrightability were inconsistent, Posner considered the argument for the expiration
of the statute of limitations. Id. at 652-57. McFarlane claimed that the "all related
characters" copyright notice established his ownership of the characters. See id. at
654. Alternately, he McFarlane argued that if the characters were copyrightable,
they only became so through his further work published after Spawn No. 9 was
published. Id. at 567.
2 99 Id. at 658-59.
300 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659 (emphasis in original).
301 Id. Judge Posner later suggests that the Gaiman might have an independently
copyrightable contribution in Count Cogliostro through his description and dialogue
even though the graphic expression of a comic book more finely defines him. Id. at
660. Otherwise, the writer is presumed to contribute "merely a stock character,"
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product is copyrightable, yet one can imagine cases in which none of
the separate contributions of the four collaborating artists would
be."302
Gaiman and McFarlane were entitled to ownership of the
copyright in Count Nicholas Cogliostro because the character was a
joint work with equal contributions from them both.303 Although a
"drunken old bum" is a stock character, Cogliostro had finer
304delineation due to his specific name, dialogue, and appearance.
"Cogliostro's age, obviously phony title ("Count"), what he knows and
says, his name, and his faintly Mosaic facial features combine to create
a distinctive character. No more is required for a character
copyright." 3 05 "Although Gaiman's verbal description of Cogliostro
may have been of a stock character," not copyrightable in itself, "once
he was drawn and named and given speech he became sufficiently
distinctive to be copyrightable."306 Conversely, without Gaiman's
contribution of expressive content, Cogliostro "wouldn't have been a
character at all, but merely a drawing." 3 07
Yet, Medieval Spawn seemed a "closer case" than
Cogliostro.308 As yet unnamed in Spawn No. 9, he is only
which only acquires copyrightable distinctiveness through the work of the other
artists. Id. at 659.
3Id. at 659. The four artists include the writer (Gaiman), "the penciler who creates
the art work (McFarlane), the inker (also McFarlane, in the case of Spawn No. 9, but
it would often be a different person from the penciler) who makes a black and white
plate of the art work, and the colorist who colors it." Id.
303 Id. at 661.
304 Id. at 660.
305 Id. To suggest otherwise would call into question the character copyrights in
Batman (DC Comics Inc v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1982)),
Mickey Mouse (Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753-55 (9th Cir.
1978)), Superman (Detective Comics v. Bruns Pubs, 111 F.2d 432, 433-34 (2d Cir.
1940)), and Betty Boop (Fleisher Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d
276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934)).
306 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 661.
307 id.
308 See id.
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distinguished from other Hellspawn through his costume, manner of
speech, and medieval background.309  Judge Posner found those
elements amounting to enough expressive content for copyrightablility
because "Spawn itself ... is not a stock character ... 310 Rather,
Medieval Spawn was sufficiently distinct from Spawn to be a
derivative work of his present day equivalent.311
Posner impliedly adopts Nimmer's suggestion-and the
statutory language-of truly collaborative authorship.312  Although
Gaiman's contribution went beyond plot and stock character ideas into
distinctive descriptions and dialogue, without McFarlane's artwork,
the comic book would not exist.3 13  While both dialogue with a
character description and artwork seem to be independently
copyrightable, Judge Posner instead decided that their contributions
could not be separated as the rule required.314
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CASES: THE COURTS ARE
MISCONSTRUING THE STATUTE
A. There Is No "Intent" to Be Joint Owners Requirement
The modem interpretation of the statute by the courts,
especially the Second Circuit, is, as stated before, contrary to the
309 Id. (stating that the lack of a name in his introductory issue was not critical
because the Lone Ranger "doesn't have a proper name either").
310 d.
311 Id. at 661-62.
312 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659. The court noted that Nimmer suggests that "if authors
A and B work in collaboration but A's contribution is limited to plot ideas that
standing alone would not be copyrightable, and B weaves the ideas into a completed
literary expression, it would seem that A and B are joint authors of the resulting
work." Id. (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07 (2010)).
313 See id.
314 See id.
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statutory language, as well as contrary to congressional intent. It is
important to look again to the Supreme Court's decision in Reid.315
After determining that the work was not a "work made for hire" and
that the Community for Creative Non-Violence did not have a full
statutory "authorship" interest in the work, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's
order to remand the case for a determination of whether it was a "joint
work."3 16 If the proper standard were "intent to be joint owners," as
later articulated in Childress, Erickson, and Larson, the Supreme Court
would not have remanded the case. In Reid, the dispute was an "all-or
317
nothing" ownership dispute. The parties litigated bitterly for years
all the way to the Supreme Court over the issue of absolute
ownership. 3 18 The facts of Reid clearly demonstrate an intent not to be
joint owners.3 19 The Supreme Court remanded the issue for a
determination of joint authorship under the statute.320 The issue to be
settled on remand was whether the parties had the intent to merge their
respective contributions into a "unitary whole." 32 1
Even so, in creative dramatic and musical productions, courts
seem to punt on determining the subjective intent of the authors when
there is at least one dominant creator in the relationship. Instead, if
one party has most of the artistic control and another can be deemed a
mere collaborator on a portion of the work, then the only intent that
matters is that which is held in the mind of the dominant creator.322
315 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 730.
316 Id. at 753.
317 See generally id. at 738.
318 See id. at 733-38.
3 19 See id. at 733-37.
3 20 Id. at 753.
3 2 1Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
322 See Dockery, supra note 52, at 9 ("Courts sometimes tend to sidestep the hard
work of ascertaining mutual subjective intent where there is a dominant person
directive creative activity.").
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B. There Is No Authority for Requiring That Each
Contribution Be Independently Copyrightable
In 1987, and again in 1989, there were attempts to amend the
323
"joint work" provision in Section 101 of the Copyright Act. Senator
Cochran introduced legislation to include the requirement of
"independent copyrightability" for each author's contribution.324 The
bill never passed, and the statute does not embody, and has never
embodied, the proposed changes.325 If a bill was introduced to add
that standard and the standard never made it into the law, Congress,
through the language of the statute, is telling us that "independent
copyrightability" is not the standard. The general understanding
among most of the courts and Congress was that there had to be "a
genuine contribution" to the total work. Although there may still be
some ambiguity and litigation over what constitutes a "genuine
contribution," that standard addresses de minimis contributions, such
as modifications and changes made by an editor, actors' ad libs that
end up in the final script, and so on.
Many believe that the "independent copyrightability" standard
adopted by the courts derives from Justice O'Connor's conclusory
326holding in Feist v. Rural Publications that "[o]riginality is a
constitutional requirement." The source of Congress' power to enact
copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl.8, of the Constitution, which
authorizes Congress "to secure for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings."327 Justice O'Connor
essentially equated "author" in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the
323 See S. 1223, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
324 d.
325 d.
326 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
327 Id. at 346. It should be noted that the capitalizations of the nouns "Times,"
"Authors," and "Writings" appear as they did in the original. At the time of the
drafting of the Constitution, nouns were often capitalized, as they are today in
modem German.
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United States Constitution (the Copyright and Patent Clause) with
"one who creates original material."3 28 This decision was not based
329
upon any thorough analysis of the framers' intent, for there is none.
The Copyright and Patent Clause was adopted without debate. 330 As
Professor Hamilton stated in her work, Historical and Philosophical
Underpinnings of the Copyright Clause:
The [Constitutional] Convention record yields little.
The Copyright Clause was introduced, never debated,
never amended. It seems to be fait accompli that
sparked no concerns from a group that wrangled for
331
months over powers of the federal government.
Justice O'Connor's conclusion that something be "original" is
a constitution requirement results from her blindly following two very
old Supreme Court cases, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v.
Sarony332 and The Trade-Mark Cases.333 By decreeing that
"originality" was a constitutional requirement, the Court held that
works protected under "the sweat of the brow" doctrine that rewarded
industrious labor in a Lockean sense were not available for
protection.334 Professor Jane Ginsburg of Columbia Law School set
328 Id. at 346-47.
329 See generally Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
330 See Marci A. Hamilton, Historical and Philosophical Underpinnings of the
Copyright Clause, 5 Occasional Papers In Intellectual Property From Benjamin
Caldozo School of Law 1, 9 (1999).
331 See id.
332 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
333 100 U.S. 82 (1879). See also Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (finding that "originality" is a
constitutional requirement).
334 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60.
54 IDEA 157 (2014)
Joint Works Under United States Copyright Law 215
forth the case that works created through labor should be protected.335
Such works would not be protected under Feist.336
There is evidence that "author" is not constitutionally required.
First, if one examines the Copyright Act of 1976, one finds much
language to the contrary.337 Section 102(a), the provision that sets
forth the standards for copyrightable subject matter, uses the words
"[c]opyright subsists in accordance with this title, in original works oJ
authorship . . . "338 Section 101 includes "original works of
335 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection
Works ofInformation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865 (1990) (arguing for protection of
"sweat works" in a piece written before Feist).
336 See generally Feist, 499 U.S. 349.
337 See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
338 See id. That section of the statute states:
Sec. 102. Subject Matter of Copyright: In General
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
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authorship" in the definitions of both derivative works and collective
works. 339 The contention that "originality equals author" is further
belied when one looks to the "works made for hire" doctrine. The
employer or the commissioning party, if the other requirements of
Section 101(2) are met, is the statutory "author." 340 The contribution
of the "author" in these cases is a paycheck! How can a paycheck be
''copyrightable contribution"?
Congress deliberately chose to modify the language in the 1909
Act, to state "all the writings of an author," because of the
341
ambiguity. Moreover, the inclusion of "original works of
authorship" in several portions of the statute and the absence of this
phrase in the "joint work" sections can lead one to believe that there is
no copyrightable contribution. As Senator Cochran's proposed
amendments to include the requirement of "copyrightable
contribution" illustrates, Congress did not think that there was an
originality requirement at the time.342 When drafting the 1976 Act,
Congress could easily have stated "original contributions of authors"
instead of "contributions" of authors. 343 "Author" in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 is neutral.344
It has been argued that because the words "Authors,"
"Writings," and "limited Monopoly" are used in the same clause, there
is protection for all of the writings of authors.345 If there is protection
for an author, and if originality is the requirement for copyright, then
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
340 See id.
341 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
342 S.1223, 100th Cong. (1987); S.1253, 101st Cong. (1989).
343 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081,
superseded by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).
344 For a discussion of the definition of "author," see generally Russ Versteeg,
Defining "Author"for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1323 (1996).
345 Randall P. Bezanson & Joseph M. Miller, Scholarship and Fair Use, 33 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 409, 425 (2010).
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an "author" is one who creates something original. Indeed, this
argument could have been supported under a reading of the provisions
of the 1909 Act, which protected all "the writings of an author." 346
When Congress was drafting the Copyright Act of 1976, it
realized that the provision in the 1909 Act regarding "authors" was
ambiguous.347 In order to eliminate this ambiguity, the language in the
1976 Act provided for "...original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression . . ."3 If "author" means "original,"
as advocated by some, then why add the word "original"? Would
there not be the same meaning had the statute been drafted "works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression"?
Words are the tools of the lawyer's and legislator's craft. They
are chosen with deliberation, not capriciously. The word "original" in
Section 102(a) of the Act implies that there can be two types of works
of authors: (a) original works of authorship and (b) nonoriginal works
of authorship. The only type of work that is protectable under the
copyright laws are works of type (a)-"original works of
authorship." 34 9 Nonoriginal works that are the end products of an
author's endeavors are not protectable. Congress, under its
constitutional authority, made facts, ideas, methods, and systems of
operation unprotectable under copyright law in Section 102(b).350
This difference is more than just a semantic difference.
Anyone who writes something-or, for that matter, creates
something-is an author. Casebooks and reporters are replete with
opinions in which something that has been created is deemed not
original and, therefore, not protectable. Is the person who writes an
unprotectable idea an author? Is the person who compiles an
unprotectable compilation not an author?
346 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081,
superseded by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).
347 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
348 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added).
349 id.
350 See id. § 102(b).
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The standard under the 1976 Act is the same as under the 1909
Act. 35 1 This standard is that of originality. Therefore, when Congress
in the House Report stated that the originality requirement would not
change, Congress was talking about the standard, not the definition of
author.352 The unambiguous language of Section 102(a), changed
from the ambiguous language of the 1909 Act, leads one to the
conclusion that not all works of authors are original.
If not all works are not original, then the language in Section
101 defining a joint work does not carry with it any originality
requirement on the part of the respective contributions of
collaborators. Just as Congress added the word "original" to Section
102(a) of the Act, so, too, could Congress have added the work
"original" to Section 101's definition of a "joint work." Congress
easily could have written the statute as follows: "A 'joint work' is the
original contributions of authors . . . etc."
When reading a section of a statute, one must not read it in a
vacuum. Sections of statutes must be read in the context of other
sections of the same statute. When reading Sections 102(a) and 101
together, one reaches the unmistakable conclusion that the work of an
author and an original work of authorship are not the same thing. An
original work of authorship is one of the potential categories of works
of authorship. In order to qualify for copyright protection, the work
must be an original work of authorship under Section 102(a).
C. The Court Has Failed to Address the Rights of
Collaborators Who Make Copyrightable
Contributions in the Absence of Intent
In most of the cases, the courts have based their holdings on a
lack of "mutual intent to the joint authors." In doing so, the courts left
open the issue of the respective rights of the parties in the event that
each collaborator has made a copyrightable contribution. This creates
351 Compare Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075,
1081, superseded by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(2012).
352 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
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a potential nightmare, whereby each party may enjoin the other party
from using any of the copyrightable material contributed by the other.
It also fosters additional litigation in order to determine exactly what
the copyrightable contributions are. While ideas may not be protected,
expression may.353 Courts would have to decide what is an idea and
what is expression. In addition, courts would have to determine
whether characters are "sufficiently developed" to receive protection
or not.
In future joint-work cases, the issue of "implied nonexclusive
licenses" should be addressed. An "implied nonexclusive license
arises when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work,
(2) the creator (the licensor) makes the particular work and delivers it
to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends the that
licensee-requestor copy and distribute his work."3 54  The implied
license doctrine gets around the writing requirement of Section 204. It
also prevents the problem of parties who have specifically made
contributions on commission for a particular purpose totally
preventing the party who paid for the work from using any of it. For
example, had Thomson attempted to enjoin all use of her contributions
to Rent, the Larson heirs could have brought up the "implied license"
doctrine.
353 See David A. Gerber, Joint Authorship Requirements Questioned by Courts,
Experts, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 30, 1990, at 24 ("Although a contribution may not contain
protected expression, it nonetheless may constitute an important (sometimes
disproportionately important) contribution to the final product. A creator whose
efforts may be extensive should not be excluded from sharing these rewards, nor
should the co-creator be over-rewarded by being deemed the sole owner of the
work.").
354 Lulirama, Ltd., Inc,. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir.
1997); see also I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996); Effects
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1990).
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D. Patent Law Does Not Require Each Inventor to Make
A Fully Patentable Contribution
It is also instructive to take a brief look at the sister area of
intellectual property, patents, for guidance. The authority to regulate
patents is also granted in Section 8, Clause 8, of Article I of the U.S.
Constitution: "[Congress shall have the power] [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Writings and
Discoveries." 3 55 The requirements for "joint inventorship" in patent
law are, however, totally different, from those of "joint authorship" in
copyright law.356 There is no requirement that the contribution of each
joint inventor be independently patentable (i.e., "useful," "novel," and
"non-obvious") by itself.3 57 This is especially interesting given Justice
O'Connor's unequivocal holding that "originality is a constitutional
requirement" for all authors in Feist.358 By the same logic, shouldn't
"patentability" be a constitutional requirement for all "inventors"?
The requirements for "inventorship" are (1) conception of the
subject matter of the invention and (2) corroboration of the invention
with others.359 Conception has been defined as "formation in the mind
355 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
356 Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 283, 310-11 (2010).
357 d.
358 See Feist, 499 U.S.at 346.
359 See Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); see also Dale L. Carlson & James R. Barney, The Division ofRights
Among Joint Inventors: Public Policy Concerns After Ethiconv. U.S. Surgical, 39
IDEA 251 (1999); Anthony J. Luppino, Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership
Uncertainties to Facilitate University-Generated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REv. 367,
398-403 (2009-10); see generally Tigran Guledjian, Teaching the Federal Circuit
New Tricks: Updating the Law ofJoint Inventorship in Patents, 32 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1273 (1991).
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of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice."360
Determining whether an alleged inventor participated in
conceiving the subject matter or, phrased and her way made a
"conceptual contribution" is important in determining who is a "joint
inventor." For parties to be legally deemed to be "joint inventors," it
is not necessary that they: (1) physically work together at the same
time; (2) make the same type or amount of the contribution; or (3)
make a contribution to the subject matter of each claim of the entire
patent.361
The standards for "joint inventorship" are much closer to those
of the statutory language in copyright than to the new standards
articulated in Childress. In fact, the consequence of deliberately
omitting one who made a "conceptual contribution" to the invention
because one of the inventors or the "dominant inventor" had the intent
to own it herself is invalidity of the entire patent.362 All inventors must
be named in the patent application, regardless of size of the
contribution of the respective joint inventor.
VI. CONCLUSION
The limits of copyright law should be set by Congress. If a
court does not think that the statute, as written, will bring about the
right result, it is not for the court to engage in judicial legislation by
determining what is "more in the spirit of copyright." As the Supreme
Court said in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. :363 "The
360 Hybritech v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS § 376 (1890)).
361 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d. at 1460 & 1471; see also Guledjian, supra note 359, at
nn.74-90 and accompanying text.
362 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 116 & 256.
363 406 U.S. 518 (1972). In Deepsouth, the Supreme Court held that supplying a
device in parts - a condition that was not in "operable assembly"-did not amount
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direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts. When, as here, the
Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to
go can come only from Congress." 364 Courts should adhere to this
admonition. As the statute now stands, there is no requirement for
copyrightable contribution or for mutual intent to be joint authors.
While application of the statute, as written, might bring about some
undesired results, such as giving an authorship interest to one with
whom one of the collaborators did not wish to share, it is not up to a
court to rewrite the law in the "spirit" of what it thinks the law should
be. If the law stands as is, courts should apply the "implied license"
doctrine.
It should be remembered that the "works made for hire" 365
case, Reid, was a very statutory case.366 In fact, the Justices took their
time and effort to adhere to the statute, specifically noting that in the
1976 Act, Congress had created two different subsections, one for
works created by employees and one for works created by commission
367
of special order. Several courts were still employing old law in their
cases, and they were admonished by the Supreme Court for not
following the new statutory language that distinguished between the
categories of works. Yet, only one year later, the Second Circuit
ignored the statutory language of the "joint works" doctrine and
developed its own standard that unfortunately has been followed by
too many courts.
Admittedly courts have not been too happy with the statutory
language, and that has led the courts to define their own standards.
But it is up to Congress to change a statute, not the courts. If courts
send the message to Congress that a law, as it stands, does not provide
adequate results, Congress will reevaluate it and, if necessary, amend
to infringement. Id. at 528. The Court sent the message that it is up to Congress to
establish the boundaries of the law. See id.
364 Id. at 530.
365 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(1) & 101(2).
366 See Reid, 490 U.S. 730.
367 See id. at 738.
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the statute, as it has done in the past, such as in response to
Deepsouth3 68 or, in 1997, in response to La Cienega Music v. ZZ
Top. 369
If Congress feels that it is proper to add a "copyrightable
contribution" standard, then Congress should amend the statute
accordingly. As discussed earlier, legislation to do so had been
introduced in the past and did not pass. If Congress feels that "intent"
should be changed from "intent to merge the contributions into
interdependent or inseparable parts of a unitary whole" to "mutual
intent to be joint owners," then Congress should amend the statute.
However, if Congress is going to amend the statute to provide for
"mutual intent to be joint authors," Congress should add a writing
requirement. As the cases illustrate, the lack of a writing between the
parties often is found by the courts to be evidence of a lack of intent.
That may or may not be true. If the parties had the intent at the time
that the project started but had a falling out later, it is easy for one of
them to say, "I never had the intention to share ownership or
authorship."
The following language should be added to the relevant portion
of section 101: "provided that the parties sign a written instrument
stating that the work shall be a 'joint work."' Although it does not
reflect the "real world" practice, other sections of the Copyright Act
have "written instrument" requirements. 37 0 The parties would quickly
learn that a writing is necessary. This proposal would create a clear
standard and, if followed, would establish the intent of the parties.
368 Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 530 ("When, as here, the Constitution is
permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from
Congress.").
369La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 927 (1996). Congress reacted to Supreme Court inactivity, and passed 17
U.S.C. § 303(b), which provides: "The distribution before January 1, 1978, of a
phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of any musical work,
dramatic work, or literary work embodied therein."
370 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(2) & 204.
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In general, creative parties do not sign agreements when they
begin work. As stated previously, in general, creatives do not have
lawyers on retainer. There are, however, incentives for collaborators
to agree in advance. Joint authors, regardless of their quantitative
contribution, are considered to be pro rata owners without a
modification by agreement.371 If the parties put it in writing, then one
who contributes 80% of the material can negotiate with the other party
to receive 80% of the royalties. In addition, without an agreement,
each party is free to commercialize the work as he or she wishes-with
the exception of assigning it away or granting an exclusive license-
subject to an accounting and payment of the proper share of royalties.
If one party desires only to license to PBS and the other wants to
license to The Jerry Springer Show, there is nothing that can be done
about without an agreement setting forth the respective uses and
limitations. The law should move toward certainty. Judicial
legislation-shaping the law into what a court thinks it should be-is
not the way to do it.
371 Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1984).
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